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TREIBACHER INDUSTRIE, A.G. v.
ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.: A
PERSPECTIVE ON THE LACKLUSTER
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CISG BY
AMERICAN COURTS
Trevor Perea

I.

INTRODUCTION

Vast differences exist between the legal systems of the
countries that have ratified the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter
"CISG" or "Convention"). It was under the pretense of resolving
such differences that the Convention attempted to reconcile
common law, civil law and socialist legal systems with the advent of one comprehensive international sales law.' It has been
noted that the states already party to the Convention account
for over sixty percent of the world's trade, a fact that indicates
to some that international trade is supplanting domestic trade
in terms of significance in a maturing global economy. 2 Given
this context, it is no surprise that the CISG is generally characterized as enormously successful in its undertaking, 3 though it
certainly has its share of detractors. 4 Despite the inevitable difficulties in creating and implementing such a body of law, the
1 See Larry A. DiMatteo, An InternationalContractLaw Formula: The Informality of InternationalBusiness TransactionsPlus the Internationalizationof Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
CoM. 67, 94 (1997) [hereinafter International Contract Law Formula].
2 Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and ContractualObligation
Through the Prism of Uniform InternationalSales Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3
(1996).
3 See Franco Ferrari, What Sources of Law for Contractsfor the International
Sale of Goods? Why One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
314 (2005).
4 See Arthur Rosett, The InternationalSales Convention: A Dissenting View,
18 INT'L LAw 445 (1984); Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliationof Legal Traditions in
the United Nations Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAW

443, 444 (1989).
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Convention has made magnificent strides towards achieving a
bona fide international sales law, due in large part to its ability
to eliminate many of the legal entanglements involved in international sales transactions that are created by merchants' ignorance of foreign domestic laws. 5
The treaty itself becomes the governing domestic law once
ratified by a member state, making it the applicable contract
law to all international transactions falling under its internationality requirements, 6 although parties may opt of out the
Convention under Article 6. 7 However, the CISG does not provide an exclusive set of rules by which disputes under it must be
settled.8 Rather, as is evident from its text, the Convention has
a limited scope of application, and it wisely instructs its interpreters on how they should approach issues not expressly covered within its provisions.9 The CISG's text states that "in the
interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in
its application." 10 This instructive principle, however, has not
managed to alleviate the inherent biases of domestic tribunals
towards their own more familiar bodies of law.1"
Federal courts in the United States have varied in their adherence to this interpretative principle.1 2 Article 7 of the CISG
was implemented as a safeguard against domestic tribunal's
5 See Ron N. Andreason, MCC-Marble Ceramic Center: The Parol Evidence
Rule and Other Domestic Law Under the Convention on Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods, 1999 BYU L. REV. 352, 355 (1999).
6 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods Apr. 11, 1980, 1980 U.S.T. 129, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http:ll
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html; [hereinafter CISG]; Bernard Audit, The
Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 139, 174 (Thomas Carbonneau
ed., Dobbs-Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational Juris, 1990).
7 CISG, supra note 6, art. 6. See Assante Technologies, Inc. v. PMC-Sierra,
Inc., 164 F.Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Thomas J. Drago, & Alan F. Zoccolillo,
Be Explicit: Drafting Choice of Law Clauses in InternationalSale of Goods Contracts, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, May 2002, available at http:ll
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/zoccolillol.html.
8 See generally Ferrari, supra note 3, at 328.
9 See CISG, supra note 6, art. 7; Ferrari, supra note 3, at 328-30.
10 See CISG, supra note 6, art. 7.
11 See Camilla Baasch Andersen, The Uniform InternationalSales Law and
the Global Jurisconsultorium,24 J. L. & CoM. 159, 161 (2005).
12 Harry M. Flechtner, The U.N. Sales Convention (CISG) and MCC-Marble
Ceramic Center, Inc., v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.P.A.: The Eleventh Circuit
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natural inclination to seek refuge in the familiar legal tenets of
their jurisdictions when deciding matters governed by the Convention. 13 The now infamous decision in Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., Inc., 14 993
F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993), the first CISG case encountered by a
federal court, went so far as to entirely disregard Article 7 by
applying state law in direct opposition to the text of the CISG,
effectively displacing the Convention as the substantive law
governing the contract. 1 5 However, recent decisions have been
more conscious of the importance of analyzing the text of the
Convention and observing its "international character." 16 Despite improvements in the interpretative methodology of federal
courts confronting CISG cases, it is obvious to most observers
that more will be required from the courts if the Convention is
17
ever able to achieve its goals.
The errant decision's ability to undermine the Convention's
stated purpose of removing "legal barriers in international
trade and promot[ing] the development of international trade"
cannot be underestimated.18 Ernst Rabel, one of the CISG's
foremost progenitors, professed that a uniform body of international law's vitality assumes an ability to successfully displace
major contractual issues from domestic to international
spheres.' 9 While there will certainly be instances in which a
countervailing domestic policy outweighs a given international
Weighs in on Interpretation,Subjective Intent, ProceduralLimits to the Convention's Scope, and the Parol Evidence Rule, 18 J.L. & CoM. 259, 260 (1999).
13 CISG, supra note 6, art. 7; Larry A. Dimatteo, et al., The Interpretive Turn
in InternationalSales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence,
24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 299, 321 (2004) [hereinafter CISG Jurisprudence];See
Anthony J. McMahon, Differentiating Between Internal and External Gaps in the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods: A Proposed
Method for Determining "Governed By" in the Context of Article 7(2), 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 992, 999 (2006).
14 Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993

F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993).
15 See id.
16 See Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prod., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 886 (E.D.
Ill. 2002); Chicago Prime Packers v. Northam Food Trading, 320 F. Supp. 2d 702,
708-09 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
17 See generally Fletchner, supra note 12, at 260.
18 CISG, supra note 6, pmbl.
19 Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4
(1993).
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concern, 20 the CISG can only effectuate this foremost of purposes through the courts application of the Convention's text
during litigation. 2 1 Thus, an analysis of a decision by a federal
court concerning the CISG must assess the degree to which the
court offers guidance to practitioners and tribunals, not just in
its own jurisdiction, but any jurisdiction into which the Conven22
tion may reach.
The most recent exposition of the Convention in a United
States federal court came about in the case of TreibacherIndustrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Technologies, Inc., 464 F.3d 1235 (11th
Cir. 2006). In Treibacher, the principle issue facing the Eleventh Circuit was how to construe the meaning of a term in a
contract governed by the CISG. 23 The court offered a detailed
exposition of the Convention's text in correctly deciding this pivotal issue, ultimately holding that the meaning parties ascribe
to a contractual term in their course of dealing establishes the
meaning of the term in the face of a conflicting customary usage. 24 The court's examination of the Convention's provisions
should prove an exemplary reference point for CISG interpretation, but questions remain as to whether the decision was indeed self-explanatory in light of other provisions of the CISG.
These questions bear heavily on the potential of the Treibacher
decision to effectuate the interpretative principles set forth in
Article 7 of the CISG.
This Note seeks to recognize the Treibacher court's advancement of the CISG and its guiding principles, while also
examining the decision's shortcomings in the context of a slowly
evolving body of international case law surrounding the Convention. Part II of this note will provide a brief introduction to
the CISG, including its historical underpinnings and general
objectives. Part III will present the Treibacher decision and discuss its importance in relation to previous decisions handed
down by federal courts. Part IV will discuss interpretative
methodology's role in the development of the CISG and the
growing body of international cases surrounding the ConvenId. at 3.
Andreason, supra note 5, at 357.
See Andersen, supra note 11, at 176-79.
Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1238
(11th Cir. 2006).
24 Id.
20
21
22
23
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tion. Part V will analyze the success of the Treibacher court in
meeting the challenges set out by the CISG and acknowledge
some possible inconsistencies the decision may have with other
provisions of the Convention.
II.

PUTTING THE

CISG INTO CONTEXT: A BRIEF HISTORICAL

OVERVIEW OF THE CONVENTION

In understanding why the CISG is regarded as an important achievement in uniform sales law, a modicum of attention
should be paid to its predecessors. The CISG was preceded by
two significant bodies of uniform sales law: the Uniform Law on
the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
and the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, both
products of The Hague Conference convened on July 1, 1964.25
These conventions were the end result of a long-running effort
by Western Europe's foremost scholars to draft a uniform law of
international trade, however, the lack of a more representative
drafting committee hindered the convention's ability to gain ac26
ceptance in the international community.
In 1966 the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (hereinafter "UNCITRAL" or "Commission") was
created by the United Nations General Assembly to provide the
United Nations with a significant role in removing obstacles to
international trade and to ensure a more varied constituency
27
among the individuals actually developing the conventions.
An initial order of business for UNCITRAL was deciding
whether or not the Hague conventions could be adopted. 28 The
Commission declined adoption of both the ULIS and the ULF
due to the concerns of many countries that the conventions were
29
too deeply rooted in the legal traditions of Western Europe.
25 Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS), July 1, 1964, 834
U.N.T.S. 107; Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169.
26 See Peter J. Calleo, The Inapplicability of the Parol Evidence Rule to the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 801 (2000).

27 UNCITRAL, www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html

(last visited

Feb. 2, 2008); see Calleo, supra note 25.
28 Dennis J. Rhodes, The United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the International Law of Goods: Encouragingthe Use of Uniform InternationalLaw, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. 387, 394 (1992).
29 Calleo, supra note 26, at 801-02.
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However, the Hague conventions proved to be milestone
achievements in the development of a uniform international
sales law, and would provide much of the framework for the
30
Commission's drafting of the CISG.
The United States, who played a relatively passive role
during the Hague conference, decided to take an active role in
the UNCITRAL efforts in order to ensure its interests found
their way into final drafts. 3 1 At the Hague conference the
United States' delegation suggested reforms that would bring
the civil law oriented ULIS into accord with some of the basic
common law tenets, specifically those manifested in the UCC.32
However, the American's late entry into the revision process
combined with the drastic nature of the modifications prevented
a successful compromise on such issues. 33 Contrastingly, American involvement in UNCITRAL's efforts came at the outset of
the drafting process, allowing the delegation's proposal's to gain
34
acceptance and cohere many common and civil law concepts.
Ultimately, the American delegation played a major role in developing the CISG, with the UCC strongly effecting particular
provisions .3
In this context, the CISG hardly seems as arcane as would
be expected given its treatment by many American practitioners and jurists. 36 It is certain that at least portions of the Convention had their genesis in provisions of the UCC, a fact that
should lend the Convention an air of familiarity to American
courts. 37 Additionally, the text itself does not purport to offer
30 Rhodes, supra note 28, at 395; see Henry Landau, Background to U.S. Par-

ticipation in United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of
Goods, 18 INT'L LAW, WINTER 1984, at 29. (1984).
31 Rhodes, supra note 28, at 395.
32 Landau, supra note 30.
33 Id.
34 Id.

35 See Richard D. Kearny, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the
1980 United Nations Convention, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 289, 289-92 (1984) (book re-

view) (noting that similarities between the UCC and the CISG include such core
issues as revocation of offers, notice of defective goods, passing of risk, foreseeability of damage and preservation of goods).
36 See Andreason, supra note 5, at 352 (commenting that "the CISG has been
largely avoided by international attorneys in the US, the federal courts have encountered very few CISG cases and rarely have devoted extended analysis to the
Convention text.").
37 See Andersen, supra note 11, at 169.
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an exclusive set of solutions for any given dispute; rather, it
simply "acknowledges the realities and practices of international trade" by presenting a set of general rules that practitioners can utilize in the manner best suited to their agreements. 38
Unfortunately, as noted above, the Convention has not realized
its potential due to some of the inherent difficulties of applying
a uniform international law.
Treibacher presented the Eleventh Circuit with a rare opportunity to extrapolate the text of the CISG and demystify the
Convention as a tool for practitioners; however, the court's success in achieving these objectives is questionable in light of previous federal court decisions.
III.

THE

CISG

SURFACES IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT:

THE TREIBACHER CASE

A.

The Facts

Treibacher Industrie, AG ("Treibacher"), an Austrian vendor of hard metal powders, had agreed to sell specific quantities
of tantalum carbide to TDY for use in its Alabama plant. 3 9 The
contracts executed by the parties made the amounts specified
subject to delivery to "consignment."40 TDY refused to accept
delivery of all of the tantalum carbide specified in the contract,
instead accepting only the amount it could use at that time.4 1
TDY had surreptitiously purchased tantalum carbide from another seller at a lower price, and it subsequently notified
Treibacher that it was not obligated to accept any amount of
tantalum carbide specified in the contract over the amount that
TDY wished to use. 4 2 Treibacher sold the surplus tantalum carbide to another buyer at a lower price than specified in the contract and later sought recovery in the district court for the
balance of the amount it expected to receive in the contracts. 4 3
38 Audit, supra note 6, at 175.
39 Treibacher, 464 F.3d at 1236.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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Issue

As the parties did not dispute that the CISG governed the
dispute, 4 4 the critical issue facing the Eleventh Circuit on appeal was whether the meaning of the term "consignment"
should be interpreted according to its common usage in the
trade or according to the parties' understanding of the term in
prior dealings. 45 TDY asserted that the CISG required construction of terms according to their customary trade usages in
the industry, unless expressly agreed otherwise by the parties. 46 Treibacher's position was that, through the course of
their dealings in the prior seven years, the parties had understood the term "consignment" to mean that even though invoices would be delayed until the materials were withdrawn, a
valid sale had taken place. 47 The lower court ultimately accepted the argument that under the CISG prior understanding
through the parties' course of conduct trumped customary trade
usage. 48 TDY's argument on appeal relied on the interpretation
49
of Article 9 of the CISG.
The argument hinged upon the contention that when the
language of 9(2), which stated that "parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have made applicable to their contract" customary trade usage, was read in light of the language
in 9(1) binding parties to "any usage to which they have agreed
by any practices which they have established between themselves," it was manifest that parties could only avoid customary
50
usage of a term by express agreement between themselves.
This interpretation was bolstered by the supposition that the
word "agreed" in both provisions meant express agreements, as
opposed to tacit agreements achieved through the course of
1
conduct. 5

44 Treibacher,464 F.3d at n.5.
45 See id. at 1236-40.
46

Id. at 1237.

47 Id.
4 Id.
49
50
51

Treibacher, 464 F.3d at 1237-40.
Id. at 1238.
Id.
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C.

The Eleventh Circuit's Holding

The court in Treibacheroffered an in-depth analysis of relevant CISG provisions in rejecting TDYs argument. In holding
that, under the CISG, the meaning the parties ascribe to a contractual term in the course of dealings establishes the term's
meaning in the face of conflicting customary usage of the term,
the Eleventh Circuit took care to note the importance of reading
52
the Convention so as to give proper effect to all its provisions.
In this case, the interplay between articles 8 and 9 was central
to the reasoning of the court and interpreting the provisions
harmoniously proved to be a central theme of the decision.
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis strictly adhered to the
plain meaning of the Convention's text. The discussion of the
issue in the opinion essentially begins with a recitation of Articles 8 and 9.53 The court then applies TDY's interpretation to
the provisions of the Convention in order to expose its inconsistency with the text as a whole. 54 In rejecting that the word
"agreed," as used in both Articles 8 and 9, might require express
agreement between the parties as to the meaning of a term that
is not its customary usage, the court stated that "TDY's construction of article 9 would, however, render article 8(3) superfluous and the latter portion of article 9(1) a nullity." 55 The
court's conclusion simply acknowledged the fact that article
8(3)'s inclusion of "any practices which the parties have established between themselves" as a factor in interpreting parties'
acts and article 9(1)'s directive that parties are "bound by any
practices which they have established between themselves"
could not survive TDY's interpretation of the CISG.
An important, yet somewhat understated factor in the
court's decision was a particular interaction between the parties
in February of 2000. After an email from a TDY employee expressed an intention to return unused tantalum carbide, an employee of Treibacher responded via telephone and alerted TDY's
employee of TDY's contractual obligation to purchase all materials delivered. 5 6 TDY then kept, used, and paid for the remain52

Id. at 1238-39.

53

Id.

54

Treibacher, 464 F.3d at 1238-39.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1239.

55
56
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ing tantalum carbide. 5 7 The court interpreted this action as
TDY's "acquiescence" to Treibacher's interpretation of the contract.58 The weight given to this interaction in the decision is
59
unclear, but the court referred to it as "particularly telling."
Ultimately, the Treibacher court held that under the CISG
oral modification to a term's meaning could trump its common
usage. This conclusion seems self-explanatory, as interpreting
the word "agree" to require express agreements between the
parties would essentially negate any need for a provision like
Article 8(3). However, a deeper examination of some of the difficulties CISG interpreters face will help facilitate an understanding of the Treibacher decision's import. Additionally,
discussion of past decisions concerned with interpretation of the
Convention and the text of the Convention itself reveal that this
decision's correct substantive result does not obviate its notable
shortcomings.

IV.

INTERPRETING THE CONVENTION

Domestic tribunals will inevitably be predisposed to deciding issues based upon the legal principles of their respective forum. The Convention's authors sought to curb this inclination
by implementing Article 7.60 Article 7(1) states that interpretation of the Convention should always regard its "international
character" and the "need to promote uniformity in its application."6 1 Article 7(2), a catchall provision, offers further guidance by stating that "questions . . . governed by this
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international
law."6 2 Thus, the Convention offers at least a starting point for
interpreters confronted with issues not settled outright by the
text's plain meaning.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1239.
59 Treibacher, 464 F.3d at 1239.
60
61
62

See DiMatteo, CISG Jurisprudence, supra note 13.
CISG, supra note 6, art. 7.
Id.
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Unfortunately, the language of Article 7 leaves tribunals of
vastly different legal systems with little useful guidance in interpreting and applying an unusual body of international law.
To combat the vagueness of the statute, it is essential that exposition of the CISG by national tribunals be informed by the

"uniqueness" of the Convention and its aims. 63 Commentators
frequently instruct courts encountering the Convention to be
mindful of both the opportunity to develop a body of CISG case
law and the potentially negative ramifications that their decisions may have in the international community. 64 To be successful in this regard courts are obliged to recognize the
international community governed by the CISG to some extent.6 5 Professor Harry M. Fletchner highlights the implications for CISG tribunals:
The mandate of article 7(1) requires those applying the
Convention to transcend the modes of analysis they are accustomed to using for domestic legal questions. Indeed, they must
develop a new international legal methodology incorporating
the approaches and techniques found in other legal traditions ....

All decision makers should, if possible, seek the per-

spective of authority from legal traditions other than their
own. 6 6 Thus, the so-called mandate of Article 7 demands that

interpretation of the Convention involve an analytical methodology congruous with the international nature of the
Convention.
Nonetheless, establishing a viable methodology under Article 7 is deceivingly complex. Initially, there is the idea of the
Convention as autonomous, a supranational body of law freed
from the shackles of domestic legal dogmas. This concept has
led one commentator to suggest a consequent necessity for a
"uniform autonomous terminology" that accounts for international authority, thereby assuring the Convention's autonomy
63 Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended ContractualLiability in InternationalBusiness Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT'L
L. 111, 133 (1997) [hereinafter CISG Enforcement].
64 Calleo, supra note 26, at 826; see Andersen, supra note 11, at 176-79.
65 See Marlyse McQuillen, Comment, The Development of a Federal CISG
Common Law in U.S. Courts: Patternsof Interpretationand Citation, 61 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 509 (2007); Flechtner, supra note 12, at 269-70.
66 DiMatteo, CISG Enforceability, supra note 63, at 133 n.138.
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and uniform application. 67 The same commentator further asserts that "nothing short of inspecting, and to some degree respecting, the interpretations of other jurisdictions will satisfy
this requirement."68 However, while there is little doubt that
CISG autonomy is an imperative, a broad fiat to implement autonomous terminology creates questions as to how to develop
and harmonize such devices across a large number of dissimilar
jurisdictions.
A decision-maker seeking such conformity with foreign
tribunals' application of the CISG must harmonize its own legal
tradition with the disparate legal traditions of these foreign jurisdictions. A common suggestion has been that common and
civil law courts move towards a methodological nexus whereby
civil law tribunals increasingly emphasize case law and common law tribunals look more frequently towards legal scholarship and legislative materials. 6 9 The importance of employing
such methodology has been particularly stressed in cases of first
impression. 70 However, this proposition does little to alleviate
difficulties arising from the lack of hierarchical structure
among international courts and the varying number of substantively correct results produced in different jurisdictions.7 1 Regardless of this apparent limitation, an international body of
CISG case law can exist as an "informal" but necessary tool in
achieving uniformity. 72 What is more important is that foreign
methodology and foreign authority are more actively utilized in
meeting this objective. Whatever the chosen means, cohering
different legal traditions and modes of analysis should be the
prevailing concern in the development of case law and autonomous terminology.
67 Andersen, supra note 11, at 165.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., DiMatteo, CISG Enforceability, supra note 63, at 133; Kazuaki
Sono, The Vienna Sales Convention: History and Perspective in InternationalSale
of Goods: Dubrovnik Lectures 1, 8 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986) available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sono.html; DiMatteo, International
Contract Law Formula, supra note 1, at 79.
70 See V. Susanne Cook, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Mandate to Abandon Legal Ethnocentricity, 16 J.L. & COM.
257 (1997).
71 Franco Ferrari, The CISG's Uniform Interpretationby Courts - An Update,
9 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 233, 250 (2005).
72 DiMatteo, CISG Enforceability, supra note 63, at 133.
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Unfortunately, the value of using foreign authority is often
tempered by its practicality. For starters, there is the broad
question of how domestic courts assimilate foreign case law into
an analysis at all. Given the abovementioned difficulties in creating and utilizing a binding international case law, foreign decisions are generally suggested to have only persuasive value to
courts.7 3 In theory, this view of foreign authority will have the
effect of promoting autonomy and predictability while deterring
"idiosyncratic interpretation. '74 A divergent authority suggests
that foreign cases should not be precedent if international case
law already exists.7 5 This issue notwithstanding, a more practical impediment for judges, arbitrators and lawyers is how to access such authority.7 6 While online databases operated by
UNCITRAL and various universities throughout the world have
done much to ameliorate accessibility issues, 7 7 access may still
vary among jurisdictions depending on available resources. Regardless, access to foreign authority is not a panacea for the
vast, critical differences in interpreters' ability to acquire, process, and apply such authority in a manner that furthers the
Article 7 mandate.
Further complicating the role of foreign CISG authority is
the Convention's treatment of domestic law. The Convention
does not cover issues expressly excluded from the CISG, so domestic law is appropriately employed to settle issues of validity,
property law or product liability, none of which are treated by
the CISG.78 While domestic law may be referenced under the
Convention, certain guidelines arguably exist before such exception should be taken.7 9 One author makes the point that
73 Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d
702, n.ll (N.D. Ill. 2004); Sunil R. Harjani, The Convention on Contracts for the
InternationalSale of Goods in United States Courts, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49, 66
(2000); Ferrari, supra note 71, at 250.
74 Andersen, supra note 11, at 169.
75 Michael J. Bonell, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION, 65, 74 (C. Massimo Bianca & Michael
J. Bonell eds., 1987).
76 Ferrari, supra note 71, at 242.
77 Id. at 243.
78 Id. at 239.
79 DiMatteo, CISG Jurisprudence,supra note 13, at 313 n.50 ("Before the reference to the proper domestic law . . . one may follow two methods . . . first is the
analogical application of specific provisions ... second is the reference to general
principles which are explicitly stated.., or are derived from the set of the Conven-
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such recourse should be a "last resort" and much consideration
should be given to the Convention's carefully constructed ambiguities before applying domestic law.80 However, such ambiguities allow a strong argument for uniformity in CISG application
occasionally taking a back seat to domestic tribunals' need to
interpret expressions in accordance with domestic legal principles."' Therefore, the Convention, though an autonomous, substantive body of law, complicates uniform application across
signatory states by not fully foreclosing or explaining the role of
domestic law.
Consequently, American courts commonly face the challenge of distinguishing matters appropriately settled by domestic law and those properly decided based solely on the
Convention's text and "general principles." It is often argued
that interpretation of not only ambiguities but also gaps in the
Convention's text should be conducted without consulting domestic law whenever possible.8 2 Divergent arguments find resort to domestic law proper in the case of gaps in the CISG, but
entirely inappropriate otherwise.8 3 There is also an important
distinction between gaps resulting from matters outside the
Convention's scope and those resulting from the Convention's
failure to expressly resolve an issue, with the former arguably
excluded from Article 7(2)'s directive that discrepancies be "settled in conformity with the general principles on which [the
Convention] is based."8 4 An explanation for both the confusion
tion's provisions." (quoting Anna Kazimierska, The Remedy of Avoidance Under
the Vienna Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods, in PACE REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 172 (19992000), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kazimierska.html)).
80 See DiMatteo, CISG Jurisprudence,supra note 13, at 314.
81 Ferrari, supra note 71, at 240-41 (stating "This is true for instance in respect of the expression 'private international law' employed by the CISG. Since the
CISG constitutes a substantive law convention that does not set forth private international law rules, the reference to 'private international law' has to be understood as a reference to the private international law of the forum.").
82 Ferrari, supra note 71, at 237.
83 Calleo, supra note 26, at 827.
84 Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretationof the 1980 Sales Law, 24 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 217 (1994) [hereinafter 1980 Sales Law]. See also Anthony J.
McMahon, Note, Differentiating Between Internal and External Gaps in the U.N.
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods: A ProposedMethod
for Determining "Governed By" in the Context of Article 7(2), 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 992 (2006).
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and the numerous gaps in the Convention is that the CISG is a
"product of studied ambiguity" and extensive compromise
among the delegates from the various nations that participated
in its drafting.8 5 As a result, the provisions of the Convention
require broad interpretation, or what has been termed "code
based interpretative methodology."8 6 This analytical approach,
typical to the code based civil law systems, contrasts with
American courts' reliance on the common law for filling statutory gaps.8 7 Article 7, however, demands that the "general principles" underlying the CISG displace the common law in this
regard, a concept that has proven difficult for American courts
to grasp88
It is difficult to pin down exactly how courts should go
about adopting new interpretative methodology in applying the
Convention. Interpreting the CISG, at the very least, requires
an understanding of the whole body of law, meaning provisions
and their underlying justifications cannot be isolated from the
general principles flowing throughout the Convention.8 9 Numerous factors suggest that this understanding should not be
too difficult for the American jurist to attain.9 0 These factors
include the Convention's efficient, concise language, its strong
similarities to the UCC and the heavy use of cross-referencing
between articles. 9 1 One commentator has noted that the European signatories, in addition to their geographic proximity and
more established lines of communication, have the advantage of
85

DiMatteo, CISG Jurisprudence,supra note 13, at 315.

86 See Karen B. Giannuzzi, Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
Temporarily Out of "Service"?, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 991 (1997). See also
Joanne M. Darkey, A U.S Court's Interpretationof Damage Provisions Under the
U.N. Convention for the InternationalSale of Goods: A PreliminaryStep Towards
an InternationalJurisprudenceof CISG or a Missed Opportunity?, 15 J.L. & COM.
139, 140 (1995); Ronald Brand & Harry Flechtner, Arbitration and ContractFormation in InternationalTrade: First Interpretationsof the U.N. Sales Convention,
12 J.L.& COM. 239, 260 (1993).
87 Cf.Jeffrey Hartwig, Schmitz-Werke GMBH & CO. v. Rockland Industries
Inc. and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of
Goods (CISG): Diffidence and Developing InternationalLegal Norms, 22 J.L. &
COM. 77, 84 (2003) (discussing the analytic tradition of U.S. courts and its effect on
interpretation of the Convention).
88 Id. at 84-85.
89 DiMatteo, CISG Jurisprudence,supra note 13, at 319 .

90 Cf. DiMatteo, International Contract Law Formula, supra note 1, at 79.
91 Id.
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resolutions designed by the Sub-Committee on the Uniform Interpretation of European Treaties that offer specific guidelines
for the interpretation of supranational legislation. 9 2 American
jurists may not have the benefit of such proximity and accord
with many neighboring signatory states' legal systems, but the
Convention's fluency and occasional similarity to the UCC
should provide a degree of comfort nonetheless.
Though the UCC has been credited with the genesis of numerous CISG provisions, 9 3 American courts that indulge in
analogizing the two will stray from Article 7's mandate. Recourse to the UCC in divining the Convention's treatment of
similar issues could pose complicated problems even in a relatively simple case like Treibacher. For instance, Article 9(2) includes in the parties' contract trade usages widely known in
"international trade" and which the parties knew or should
have known. 94 Clearly, such trade usages may or may not include domestic or local usages depending on the facts of the dispute. 95 But beyond the threshold issue of whether a trade
usage is widely known in international trade is the disparate
importance a particular usage may have in different jurisdictions. 96 0ne authority points out that developing nations tend to
view, and as a result resist, trade usages as derivatives of the
industrial word and its interests. 9 7 Similarly, socialist regimes
place limited import on trade usages due to their intrinsic incompatibility with a planned economy. 98 This conflict was at
the core of the much-debated compromise made by the Convention's drafters. 99 The Convention's predecessor, the Uniform
Law for the International Sale of Goods, prescribed a "normative" solution to this problem that made usages applicable
whether or not parties knew of or consented to the terms. 10 0 Article 9 of the CISG is in large part a response to the protests by
92

Id. at 81.

93 See Kearny, supra note 35.
94 CISG, supra note 6, art. 9(2).
95 See Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and
the Construction of Uniform Law, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (1996) [hererinafter Relationship].
96 Id.

97 Id.
98 Id.

99 Van Alstine, supra note 2, at 48.
100 Id. at 47-48.
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socialist countries and developing nations that viewed the inclusion of such terms as a perpetuation of the industrialized
West's interests. 1 1 Article 9's treatment of trade usages has
been described as a "specific expression" of the Convention's emphasis on party autonomy. 10 2 Party autonomy is derived from
Article 6 of the CISG.' 0 3 Unlike Article 6 of the CISG, "UCC
Article 2 offers no authorized way generally to exclude trade usages and courses of dealings."10 4 Additionally, courts have
taken pains to read trade usage as consistent with express
terms in UCC contracts. 0 5 Ultimately, viewing the treatment
of trade usage by the CISG and the UCC as substantively similar is, as one scholar put it, "simply wrong." 0 6 Thus, the
Treibacherdecision, in which the issue centered on application
of trade usage to the contract, would find resort to the UCC's
analogous provisions a hindrance to properly interpreting the
Convention.
Despite Article 7's mandate and the Convention's fundamentally different treatment of such issues, some courts have
still turned to analogous provisions of the UCC for interpretative aid. In Delchi CarrierSpa v. Rotorex Corp., the court held
that analogous provisions of the UCC could be used to interpret
the CISG.' 0 7 The court qualified its holding by stating that
UCC case law was not per se applicable.10 8 The Delchi decision,
which was affirmed in Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam
Food Trading Co. ,109 found such recourse appropriate even in
light of Article 7.110 Chicago Prime, to be fair, offered an extensive review of relevant foreign case law in its exposition of the

101 Id.
102

Id. at 49.

CISG, supra note 6, art. 6.
Avery Wiener Katz, The Relative Costs of IncorporatingTrade Usage into
Domestic Versus InternationalSales Contracts: Comments on Clayton Gillette, InstitutionalDesign and InternationalUsages Under the CISG, 5 CHi. J. INT'L L. 181,
187 (2004).
103

104

105

Id. at 186

106
107

See Ferrari, Relationship, supra note 96.
Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995).

108

Id. at 1028.

109 Chicago Prime Packers, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 708-09.

110 Delchi, 71 F.3d at 1027.
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CISG. 11 Still, the holdings stand as a point of criticism for
112
many observers.
V.

THE TREIBACHER COURT'S INTERPRETATION

The Treibacher court's challenge was to define the interplay between articles 8 and 9 in deciding whether trade usage
or the parties' oral modification controlled the meaning of the
disputed contractual term. While the court's decision is ostensibly simple, the interaction between these two articles is not.
Article 8(3) of the CISG allows "all relevant circumstances of
the case" to be included in discerning parties intent as to the
meaning of a term. Like UCC Article 2, trade usages, course of
performance, course of dealing and express terms are all fair
game in extracting the parties' actual understanding of a contractual term. While these factors are all within the ambit of
Articles 8 and 9, the Convention's text does not seek to order
these items in any way, thereby leaving domestic tribunals with
the task." 3 This fact is especially notable in reference to an
American court's decision because the UCC does provide a hierarchy among these terms; thus, American jurists may be
tempted to cross-reference the UCC's treatment of these terms
in its interpretation of the CISG, a methodology that has been
suggested in at least one American decision' 4 and strongly criticized by commentators. 1 5 The role that international application will have in determining a "uniform notion" of trade usage
under the Convention has been repeatedly emphasized. 16 Consequently, it is imperative that American jurists approach these
111 Chicago Prime Packers, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 712-14.
112 Francesco G. Mazzotta, Why Do Some American Courts Fail to Get It
Right?, 3 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 85, 100 (2005).
113 Timothy N. Tuggey, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contacts for
the InternationalSale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 540, 546 (1986).
114 See Delchi, 71 F.3d at 1028. See also Chicago Prime Packers, 320 F. Supp.
2d at 709 (quoting Delchi).
115 See James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts
for the InternationalSale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 273, 289 (1999). See also Hartwig, supra note
88, at 89.
116 See Ch. Pamboukis, The Concept and Function of Usages in the United Nations Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods, 25 J.L. & COM. 107, 111

(2005).
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provisions with an astute awareness for the Convention's autonomy and resist recourse to familiar domestic principles.
The Treibachercourt avoided elaborate examination of the
Convention's provisions in reaching the correct substantive result and adhering to Article 7(2)'s mandate that confusion be
"settled in conformity with the general principles on which [the
Convention] is based." While Article 8 does not establish a formal hierarchy among factors such as course of dealing, course of
performance or trade usage, Article 9 seems to suggest some
semblance of order. 1 17 However, Article 9 does not clarify the
role of subsequent conduct mentioned in 8(3), leaving questions
about the impact of "silent acquiescence" on an interpretation of
the parties' past conduct. 11 8 In its decision, the Treibacher
court found such "acquiescence" in addition to the parties' practice over a seven year period to be determinative in deciding the
parties' actual understanding of the term "consignment."'1 9 In
so doing the court resisted TDY's suggestion that trade usage
controlled the meaning of a contractual term unless a contrary
express agreement between the parties existed. Instead, the
court accepted the following argument put forth by Treibacher:
Expectations that have the force of contract can be established by
patterns of conduct established by the seller and the buyer. Under
Article 9(1) the parties are bound by the 'practices which they
have established between themselves.' 'Practices' are established
by a course of conduct that creates an expectation that this conduct will be continued... the reference in Article 9(1) to practices
established by the parties is one example of many situations
where binding expectations may be based on conduct. See Articles
19(2), 21(2), 35(2)(b), 47(2), 73(2).120

This argument is significantly strengthened by its reading
of the provision in the context of the Convention's greater
whole. It correctly identifies the practical effects that the provi117 Jack M. Graves, Course of Performance as Evidence of Intent or Waiver: A
Meaningful Preference for the Latter and Implications for Newly Broadened Use
Under Revised U.C.C. Section 1-303, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 235, 243 (2004).
118 Id.

119 Treibacher, 464 F.3d at 1238.
120

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 40, Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny

Technologies, Inc., No. 05-13005 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2005) (quoting JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION,

124-31 (3d ed. (1999))
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sion has on interpretation of a contractual term while crossreferencing numerous other provisions of the CISG that function under a similar guiding principle. Unlike TDY's reading of
the Convention, which completely removes the provision from
its context, Treibacher's interpretation adheres to Article 7(2)'s
directive.
It is important to note some of the Treibacher decisions
shortcomings. The court did little to extend the reach of this
decision beyond the facts of this case. Unfortunately, no foreign
authority was mentioned in the decisions, nor was there reference to anything beyond the text of the Convention and the record. Whether the issue in the case required such analysis is
debatable. Irrespective of the necessity of citing authority, the
decision will probably do little in the way of developing an international precedent as its analysis avoided the myriad of issues
that may arise in interpreting the relevant provisions.
Reading the CISG so as not to negate any of its provisions
is a necessary step to its construction, but it may not have been
sufficient step in terms of achieving a complete analysis of its
application to the dispute. Article 8 of the CISG focuses on interpreting statements and conduct of parties as opposed to interpreting the Convention's text. 12 1 The framework for such
interpretation is set forth in Article 8(1) through 8(3). However,
the Treibacher decision, though it restated Article 8 in its entirety, reveals no insight into how Article 8 operates. Article
8(1) provides that statements of parties' are first to be evaluated subjectively when the other party knew or should have
known what the intent;12 2 Article 8(2) further states that if such
knowledge of intent does not exist, the evaluation becomes objective, based on a reasonable person standard. 123 Both standards are subject to Article 8(3)'s inclusion of "all relevant
circumstances," which has been widely read to include course of
performance and course of dealing.124 These interpretative
121 JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING

THE

CISG

IN THE

USA 40 (2d ed.

2004).
122 CISG, supra note 6, art. 8(1). See LOOKOFSKY supra, note 122, at 40.

CISG, supra note 6, art. 8(2). See LOOKOFSKY supra, note 122, at 40.
CISG, supra note 6, art. 8(3); John E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the United Nations Convention on
Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 11, 48 (1988).
123

124
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steps are not unfamiliar to American practitioners, 125 but they
may create confusion in the context of the CISG. 126 The court's
reluctance to conduct an analysis of the parties conduct through
the framework of Article 8 was a missed opportunity to develop
an analytical modus operandi for such disputes under the
Convention.
After restating Article 8(3), the court in Treibacher made
the blanket statement that "parties' usage of a term in their
course of dealing controls that term's meaning in the face of a
conflicting customary usage of the term."' 2 7 This statement
and the evidence of the parties' course of dealing and course of
performance were determinative. 128 While this holding does
align with conventional wisdom of Articles 8 and 9,129 it likely
merited more discussion in the opinion. Article 8(3)'s authorization of considering such factors is ostensibly aimed at discerning the intent of parties, but, as previously discussed, the
statute does not label any of these factors any more important
than the next. Contrastingly, the Uniform Commercial Code
explicitly permits course of performance and acquiescence to be
used in determining the meaning of the agreement. 130 The
Treibachercourt relied entirely on evidence of course of dealing,
yet the court supplied no authority and only a limited treatment
of the Convention's text in doing so. Numerous cases have extrapolated the meaning of Article 9(1) in defining what kind of
practices between parties would satisfy its requirements.' 3 ' In
spite of the Convention's lack of specific criteria in Article 9(1),
there is authority for the proposition that certain degrees of fre125 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 122, at 40.
126 See Murray, supra note 125 at 48.
127 Treibacher,464 F.3d at 1238-39.
128 Id.

129 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 122, at 41-42.
130 U.C.C. § 2-208 (2003); see Peter H. Pfund, The 1980 U.N. Convention on
Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods (CISG): Background and Status, 570
PLI/Corp 39, 55 (1987).
131 See Zivilgericht [ZG Basel] [Civil Court] Dec. 21, 1992, p 4 19911238 (Switz),
availableat, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/921221sl.html; Fov6rosi
Bir6sdg Metropolitan Court of Budapest [BMI Mar. 24, 1992, A212G.41.47111991
(Hung.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=l&do=case&id=19&step=Abstract; Turku Court of Appeal, Apr. 12, 2002 (Fin.), available at http:fl

cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020412f5.html;

OLG Bielefeld [LG] [District Court]

Nov. 24 1998, 11061/98 (F.R.G.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.educases/
981124gl.html.
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quency and duration must be attained to satisfy the terms of
the provision. 1 32 The court's inability to develop the roles
played by these factors limits the reach of this decision and minimizes its utility in the international case law evolving around
the CISG.
Another issue that the court circumvented was the application of a trade usage in general under the CISG. While both
parties presented ample evidence supporting differing interpretations of "consignment," there was no finding by the court as to
customary usage of the term at issue because course of dealing
controlled the disputed term's meaning. 13 3 Article 9(2)'s inclusion of trade usages is subject to limitations of the parties'
knowledge and the need for the usage to be widely known and
observed in international trade. 134 These limitations are important vestiges of the compromises made by the drafters aimed at
135
protecting parties in undeveloped or socialist countries.
Questions abound as to what is needed to satisfy Article 9(2).136
One authority, in part quoting a statement by John Honnold,
has come to the conclusion that:
The formulation of Article 9(2) ("international trade") must
"not be understood to prevent in all cases usages of a purely
local or national origin from being applied without any reference thereto by the parties." According to Honnold, "a usage
that is of local origin (the local practices for packing copra or
jute, or the delivery dates imposed by arctic climate) may be
applicable if it is 'widely known to and regularly observed by'
the parties. 137 Perhaps a cursory examination of this or similar
issues concerning trade usage in Article 9 would have fleshed
out the Treibacher decision.
An ancillary but importent aspect of the Treibachercourt's
dilemma is the operation of Article 29 in respect to such a dispute. Article 29(2) states that written agreements requiring
written amendments cannot be altered by oral agreement be132
133
134
135
136
137
SALES

Ch. Pamboukis, supra note 117, at 116.
Treibacher, 464 F.3d at n.4.
CISG, supra note 6, art. 9(2). See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 122, at 41.
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 122, at 42.
Pamboukis, supra note 117, at 116.
Id. at 120 (quoting JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 124 (3d ed. (1999)).
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tween the parties. 138 This provision's operation in a situation
like the one presented in Treibacher confounds what is otherwise a self-explanatory holding. Because the Convention has
rejected the parol evidence rule, 13 9 a merger clause seeking to
exclude the evidence used by the Treibacher court will have to
be carefully worded. Unlike the UCC, which imposes a high
standard for implementing such a merger clause, 140 the CISG
does not proffer guidance. One authority recommends explicitly
referencing UCC 2-202 to affect his purpose.1 4 1 Assuming an
effective merger clause is implemented, the question becomes
whether the parties in Treibacherwould have been confined to
a trade usage accepted by the court or whether Article 9 would
still support Treibacher's argument. While the court need not
explicitly decide an issue of this nature, the benefits of an extended analysis may have provided valuable insight for future
tribunals.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Treibacher is an encouraging foray into the
CISG landscape by an American court. But while the decision
reached was substantively correct, the path the court chose to
tread in reaching it leaves much to be desired. For the Convention to truly fulfill its promise of removing legal barriers and
promoting the interests of international trade, tribunals must
strive to achieve more than correct results. The Convention requires courts across every signatory state to consolidate and develop methodologies and mechanisms that can be applied
uniformly wherever a dispute may arise. Application of the
CISG, in a sense, requires an international syndicate of national courts, a challenge that will require a conscientious attempt to cohere the foreign and the domestic. Answering this
challenge is the CISG's mandate to every domestic tribunal.
Whether national courts respond accordingly is still an open
question.
138 CISG, supra note 6, art. 29(2).
139 See CISG AC-Opinion No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule,
Contracted Merger Clause, and the CISG, Oct. 23, 2004, Richard Hyland, Rutgers
School of Law.
140 U.C.C. § 2-202 (2003), Cmt. 2. See also Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster
Co., 451 F.2d 3, 8-9 (4th Cir. 1971).
141 Murray, supra note 125, at 45-46.
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